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Abstract 
Despite a reduction in support for US global leadership (and an apparent reduction of 
desire to provide it), it remains unlikely that we will have a traditionally conceived of 
power transition where one power cedes global predominance to a challenger any 
time soon. Although power shifts really are occurring with more actors able and 
willing to provide leadership roles, this does not presage the onset of a multipolar 
order; at least as polar orders are typically understood. Rather, we see the transition to 
an order with multiple sites of authority that lacks the fixed and stable forms of 
alliances normally associated with polarity. David Mitrany's emphasis on the 
importance of functionalism might not provide a blueprint for the future, but does 
provide a way into thinking about non-polar forms of global governance, different and 
multiple sites of authority, and different forms of leadership within this global order. 
It also adds to the study of the capability and willingness of putative leaders the 
importance of acceptance and followership in international relations. 
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Introduction 
Despite a reduction in support for US global leadership (and an apparent 
reduction of desire to provide it), it remains unlikely that we will have a 
traditionally conceived of power transition where one power cedes global 
predominance to a challenger any time soon. Although power shifts really are 
occurring with more actors able and willing to provide leadership roles, this does 
not presage the onset of a multipolar order; at least as polar orders are typically 
understood. Rather, we see the transition to an order with multiple sites of 
authority that lacks the fixed and stable forms of alliances normally associated 
with polarity. David Mitrany’s emphasis on the importance of functionalism 
might not provide a blueprint for the future, but does provide a way into thinking 
about non-polar forms of global governance, different and multiple sites of 
authority, and different forms of leadership within this global order. It also adds 
to the study of the capability and willingness of putative leaders the importance 
of acceptance and followership in international relations. 
Keywords 
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In A Working Peace System, first published in 1943,2 David Mitrany laid out a 
vision for a post-World War II global order where political differences should be 
put aside in the search for effective forms of transnational governance that 
would not repeat the errors of the past. Previous post-war settlements had 
                                                 
2 There are different versions of what was originally a Chatham House pamphlet published in 1943. 
This paper has primarily used the more commonly consulted later version (Mitrany 1966) which 
includes other works on functionalism by Mitrany and an introduction by Hans Morgenthau. 
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resulted in the establishment of organizations from the Concert of Europe 
through the Hague Convention to the League of Nations that had abjectly failed 
to do what they were meant to do and prevent the slide into another war; each 
arguably more bloody than the previous one, and in the case of the two world 
wars, certainly more widespread. With the development of useable nuclear 
weapons getting ever closer in 1943, then there could be a real existential threat 
to mankind if the same pattern repeated itself in the future. 
 
The key, he argued, was to avoid the creation of cohesive and stable groups or 
blocs of countries based on common ideological preferences and/or geopolitical 
strategic considerations. Such organizations not only created the basis for 
polarised rivalries that could lead to war, but were also in his view not very good 
governance institutions either. Coming into being through formal legal treaties 
and agreements, they would be by their very nature closed and rigid 
organisations that would simply be unable to deal with real world technical 
problems that instead required pragmatism and flexibility that spanned political 
divides. They would be:  
rigid in framework, whether geographical or ideological; rigid in its 
constitution, which has to be formal and unchallenged; rigid in its general 
life, because of the limits and obstacles the constitution places in the path 
of fresh common action (Mitrany 1966, 155-6) 
 
His alternative was to establish not a single form of governance, but multiple 
different forms instead.  This could be done by first separating out different issue 
specific policy areas, and then by allowing the technicalities of each functional 
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area to dictate how best to deal with their distinct and issue specific challenges. 
Who needed to be involved, the nature of cooperation and the way in which the 
organization functioned, and even the lifetime of each institutional arrangement 
should be defined by the agreement of technical specialists based on what was 
needed to deal with the specific shared problem. Given that each individual issue 
area would have its own set of discrete problems (and potential solutions) and 
affect different sets of actors, no two issues were likely to require the same form 
of organizational governance response. The result should be a wide range of very 
different arrangements “organized separately – each according to its nature, to 
the conditions under which it has to operate, and to the needs of the moment” 
(Mitrany 1966: 70). 
 
In the event, of course, Mitrany’s ideas did not transfer into reality, and the 
(bipolar) governance forms that evolved after 1945 went in exactly the direction 
that he feared would be ineffective, and would also fail to keep the peace. It also 
seems rather fanciful and naïve to propose a Mitranyesque depoliticised future, 
and there is no argument here that A Working Peace System provides a realisable 
blueprint for global governance in the twenty first century. Nevertheless, re-
reading Mitrany and his focus on functional approaches (and solutions) to 
managing transnational issues remains a rewarding endeavour. In particular, it 
opens the door to thinking about the nature of leadership and alliances that free 
us from some of the conceptual constraints that can be imposed by dominant 
conceptions of both power transition and polarity. 
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The beginning of the end of US global dominance that emerged from the end of 
Cold War bipolarity has been identified (and subsequently rebuffed) on a 
number of occasions over the years. If, as Layne (2012) argues, “this time its for 
real” and the unipolar period is over, one possibility is a return to a new 
dichotomised global order.  However, the more often predicted endpoint of the 
current and ongoing changing distribution of global power is a multipolar 
structure. Instinctively, this seems to make sense given the number of 
increasingly powerful actors (and not just states) that are competing with more 
established ones for influence and leadership, the current distribution of power 
capabilities amongst them, the willingness (of some) to lead, and the acceptance 
by others of (some) potential leaders’ aims and ambitions. But while this 
suggests that the “multi” part of multipolarity is useful in pointing to the 
increasing number of increasing powerful (statist) actors that are emerging in 
the global order, the very same set of considerations (power capabilities and so 
on) suggest that “polarity” part of the concept is problematic if it implies the sort 
of stable and fixed alliances that are normally associated with polar global orders.  
 
Rather than fixed bloc-type alliances, we seem to be witnessing the rise of 
multiple, overlapping and fluid constellations of power and interests that vary 
based on the specific (functional in Mitrany’s words) issue at hand. And when it 
comes to leadership, rather than seeking a single global leader – either actual or 
putative – we instead need to focus on who has the capacity, desire and 
legitimacy to lead on any given policy area. We also need to think flexibly 
(following Mitrany’s warning of rigidity) about which are the most effective sites 
and/or levels of governance, accepting that different leaders might 
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simultaneously emerge in different hierarchies (for example, different regional 
leaders and/or the relationship between regional and global leaders. Arguably 
even more important, it also requires us to focus on how and why others attach 
themselves to these putative leaders; or put another way, an essential 
component of studying leadership is to also study the sources of followership.  
 
1 Functionalism: Then and Now 
While Mitrany was writing in a different era, had limited practical policy 
influence, and might be seen to have been rather utopian in his thinking, his 
work helps us think about the nature of the current global order in three main 
ways. The first refers to the possibility that a form of institutional path 
dependency might obstruct the emergence of new forms of effective collective 
action. Here we return to what Mitrany (1965) called the “Federal Fallacy”, and 
the problem of rigidity created by the formation of fixed organizations noted in 
the introduction; particularly (but not only) regional ones.  
 
1.1 Finding the right size and fit 
Here, Mitrany was specifically interested in questions of leadership and 
legitimacy. The creation of these organizations, so his argument went, would lock 
in and perpetuate the interests and authority of the major powers that promoted 
them. This would not be palatable, he surmised, for those smaller less powerful 
states that would find their sovereignty fundamentally undermined by joining 
organisations as unequal partners. But while they might be wary of ceding 
sovereignty once and for all, they could be more prepared to deal with individual 
governance structures on a case-by-case basis (Mitrany 1966, 163). This would 
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allow them to not be dominated by a hegemon, to selectively keep out of any 
arrangements that didn't deem to be effective, or where the price of losing 
sovereignty was politically unacceptable at home, or where leadership in the 
organisation was not perceived to be legitimate (or a combination of all of these 
considerations). Moreover, while major powers would inevitably dominate a 
single federal organization, even small countries would find that there were 
some areas where they not only had expertise and authority, but were also 
perceived as having a comparative advantage by others. Thus, even the small and 
less powerful might be able to exert leadership in some issue areas (Mitrany 
1966, 65).  
 
More important, though, and the second way in which Mitrany’s relevance 
persists, was the idea that these fixed forms simply did not always represent the 
most effective site of governance. Once the membership of an organization is set, 
and the way that it works is institutionalised, then it immediately lacked the 
flexibility that was necessary to deal with a range of different challenges. For 
example, a grouping established to deal with common security challenges might 
not encompass the right mix of states and other actors best suited to dealing 
with economic or environmental concerns. Or even considering economics as a 
single entity might be problematic – the range of actors and the location of 
expertise required to regulate shipping, for example, could be very different from 
that required to find effective solutions to problems in financial flows. This is not 
to say that a formal institution might not arise with its own constitution in the 
long term, or indeed that the aggregate combination of functional arrangements 
might combine to create some form of “constitutional” change (Mitrany 1966, 
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55). But if this was the case, then the new form should not be set in stone, but 
instead allow for flexibility and change; for countries joining, leaving and/or re-
joining as the need arises. And members should also be prepared to close a 
specific institution down if it outlived its use or circumstances changed 
fundamentally (Mitrany 1966, 83). But the crucial thing for Mitrany, was that if 
such a broader constitutional form did emerge, then it should do so as a 
consequence of functional cooperation, and not become its originator. 
 
One conclusion of this way of thinking is that different types of issues require 
regulation and organisation at different levels. Some might need to be dealt with 
in truly global settings, others at the regional level, and still others in ways that 
aren’t shaped by geography and instead link commonly affected partners 
together wherever they are. Another consequences is that even within a single 
given regional area, different forms of governance might be needed to find the 
most effective solution to the specific problem at hand. For example, as argued 
elsewhere (Elliott and Breslin 2011), the most effective environmental region 
often seems to be very different from the security region, or the region of trade 
and investment. And the final conclusion is that different actors can take the lead, 
and also be perceived by others as effective and legitimate leaders, depending on 
what it is that needs to be lead and governed; a conclusion that we will return to 
more than once in this paper. In summary: 
Instead of keeping up the old and barren attempt to establish a formal 
and fixed division of sovereignty and power, a division which changing 
conditions continually puts out of joint, we would with a little insight and 
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boldness distribute power in accordance with the practical requirements 
of every function and object (Mitrany 1966, 84). 
 
1.2 The Utility of Crises 
The third continuing relevance of Mitrany’s promotion of functionalism revolves 
around his understanding of the positive role that crises can play in driving 
innovations that break down existing barriers to cooperation. The urgency of 
solving a crisis means that policy makers are likely to put aside ideology, 
principle and competition to simply do what has to be done to solve the problem 
at hand. The classic example was the way in which Roosevelt responded to the 
crisis of the Great Depression by simply doing what worked in each specific 
policy area and didn't worry too much about what this meant in terms of 
consistency across policy areas. All that mattered was whether it worked or not 
(Mitrany 1966, 56).  
 
The evolution of Chinese security policy over the years also provides a good 
example of how crises can bring about change. For example, the need to find 
common solutions to the transnational spread of SARS in 2003 and bird flu in 
2006 turned the security focus away from just security defined as guns, bombs 
and bullets to new non traditional security challenges that were best met by 
multilateral cooperation and partnership and dialogue (Wang 2004). Similarly 
the Asian financial crisis played an important role in persuading policy makers 
across the region of the mutual benefits of working together in an ASEAN+3 
framework to restore and guarantee regional financial stability. Indeed, we 
might suggest that economic crises have pushed China and Japan to seek for 
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cooperation within a common regional framework, in contrast to the struggle to 
establish different preferences for regional organisation (including what the 
region itself should actually be) in more “normal” times.  
 
Notably, the solution to these different crisis has led was not to seek for a single 
regional solution, but instead to identify different regional partners depending 
on the issue at hand. Thus while economic concerns pointed towards 
cooperation with ASEAN and Japan and South Korea, new security concerns have 
pointed instead towards:  
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, ASEAN Regional Forum, AsiaInfo 
meeting, the Asia-Pacific Security Council, the Northeast Asia Cooperation 
Dialogue and other multilateral security dialogue and cooperation 
processes (Fu 2003, 40). 
This might not be a truly functionally defined set of governance institutions, but 
at the very least avoids the “federal fallacy” that Mitrany so feared.  
 
2 The Changing Nature of the Threat: The Changing Nature of World 
Order 
If the above discussion points to continuities between Mitrany’s functionalism 
and the world today, there are of course also considerable differences between 
now and then. And these differences explain why the nature of power transition, 
the nature of world order, and the nature of leadership are also very different 
today than they were for much of the Twentieth Century 
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Mitrany argued that his apparent utopian call for the depoliticisation of 
governance was not utopian at all, but based on historical evidence. He argued 
that there was ample evidence that international cooperation was most 
successful when international interactions had moved out of the control of 
foreign ministries and into the hands of technical specialists. But if it was utopian, 
it is not surprising. A Working Peace System was inspired by not just one crisis 
but a succession of them, and the urgency of establishing a foundation for peace 
on a continent that had more or less been characterised by its absence for most 
of the preceding century and a half (at least). Even when major states weren’t 
actually at war, the fear of an impending conflict providing an overarching 
context for European international relations.  
 
WWII was latest in a line of conflicts between the major European powers. 
Arguably starting from the 1870-1 Franco-Prussian War, technological 
advancements changed the nature of warfare (Wawro 2003, 51).3 Whilst the 
search for a lasting peace was of course important, there was a more immediate 
existential threat (Haftendorn 1991, 8) and the very real possibility that one or 
more European states might be destroyed and cease to exist (Goldgeier and Michael 
McFaul 1992, 472). As Hans Morgenthau (1966, 7) noted in his introduction to 
the 1966 version of A Working Peace System, “the old national states of Europe 
barely survived the Second World War”, and their chances of surviving a Third 
were even slimmer. 
 
2.1 Cold War Bipolarity 
                                                 
3 As a result, the Conference also took the first steps in establishing what was justifiable conduct in 
war, which would later evolve into the Geneva Convention.  
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This existential threat combined with (and built on) ideological competition 
engendered strong perceptions of “us” and “them”, which in turn helped shape 
the nature of the bloc-type bipolar order that emerged after WWII. To be sure, 
we need to raise a number of caveats to soften the understanding of a stark 
bifurcation between two opposing blocs with identical membership on all issue 
areas. First, the correlation of different spaces within each side of the divide was 
never fully complete. For example, some Western European countries came later 
than others to what became European Economic Community (EEC) during the 
Cold War, and some never joined. And the membership of the EEC never 
completely matched the European membership of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO).  
 
Second, the example of NATO draws attention to different hierarchies within 
large alliances. For example, Franco-German leadership within the emerging 
European project existing under the overarching dominance of US leadership of 
the broader Western non-communist bloc (Hendriks and Morgan 2001). And 
notably, German economic leadership within the European economic project was 
not matched by leadership on security issues. Third, leadership was not 
autocratic, and there was room for countries to adopt individual initiatives and 
agenda. Again, Germany provides a good example here through the development 
of a form of rapprochement with Eastern Europe through the Ostpolitik strategy 
after 1969 (Griffith 1978). 
 
Fourth, some countries did try to follow an independent path and not ally with 
either side – though even the different members of the Non Aligned Movement 
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tended in practice to depend more on one or the other side of the divide for their 
economic and military support and interactions. Fourth, it was possible for 
countries to defect – if not to join the opposition then at least to try and tread an 
independent path, as was perhaps the case with Yugoslavia. Finally, China 
represents something of a special case. Having defected from its semi-attached 
membership of the Soviet bloc,4 China’s self-proclaimed leadership of the Third 
World was accompanied by a willingness to exploit superpower rivalry between 
Washington and Moscow to establish some degree of security dependence on the 
USA (Ross 1993).  
 
But with these caveats in mind, we can suggest that the last time the World was 
characterised by a bipolar division, the fundamental nature of alliances were 
more or less fixed and set across issue areas. By and large, countries that came 
together stuck together and stayed together, and almost by definition, being 
attracted to one of the poles meant a repulsion of (and rejection by) the other 
alternative pole. If a country decided to ally itself for security reasons, it was 
highly unlikely (to say the least) that it would seek to ally itself with the Soviet 
Union on other issue areas.  
 
2.2 The Power Transition from Unipolarity 
While it is always difficult to quantify different degrees or extents of power – 
perhaps even impossible – the highpoint of US unipolar power was arguably at 
some point near the turn of the millennium. After the end of the Cold War Japan’s 
                                                 
4 Semi-attached because despite a reliance on Soviet economic and military support in the early days of 
the PRC, China never joined either the Warsaw Pact or COMECON. 
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rise to global dominance had had failed to materialise, strong state alternatives 
to neoliberal capitalism had been discredited in the form of a economic crises in 
Asia and elsewhere in 1997 and 1998, and the rise of China was yet to be seen as 
a real and significant challenge. Krauthammer (2003, 8) – one of the strongest 
proponents of US unipolarity - even saw the US response to September 11th as a 
sign of a new source of American power that “accelerate[d] the realignment of 
the current great powers, such as they are, behind the United States”.  
 
What Krauthammer saw as a source of strength ultimately turned into a cause of 
friction, and since then a variety of different forms of intervention in the Middle East 
and North Africa have done much to reduce the appeal and force of American 
preferences and authority within the global order, and done “irreparable damage” to 
the Responsibility to Protect principle and liberal international principles more 
generally (Adekeye 2016). It’s fair to say that while there was more to the global 
financial crisis than just politics and policy in (and global leadership of) the United 
States, it has nevertheless contributed to a general feeling and understanding that en 
epochal change is imminent (if not already upon us).  And decision by President 
Trump to take the US out of the Paris Climate Agreement has been seen by many as 
“the day that America’s global leadership ended” (Reich 2017).  
 
On the other side, whilst again being all but impossible to quantify,5 the rise of 
China and others has clearly changed the distribution of power and also arguably 
hierarchies of power. For example, there seems to be a fairly widely held view 
that previous asymmetries in power capabilities between Europe and China (or 
                                                 
5 For a good collection that does a good job at trying to assess the extent of Chinese power from 
different perspectives in different areas, see Chung (2015). 
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at least some parts of Europe) have flipped, with China now occupying the 
predominant position. It is not just that there has been a shift in material 
resources and capabilities, but that the European way of managing transnational 
challenges was found wanting; not just the way in which the Euro crisis came 
about in the first place, but in the difficulty of developing a common and effective 
response to it over a relatively long period (Jones, Kelemen and Meunier 2015). 
As a result, there is a broad consensus that as a result of the crisis, “the United 
States and China are the two most important states in the international system” 
(Foot and Walters 2011, 1).  
 
So is the old unipolar order over? In thinking about change to the current global 
order, studies of the consequences of China’s rise are often informed by previous 
power transitions and the search for similarities and differences that might 
explain whether the next transition can be a peaceful one or not.6  Moreover, 
considerations of power transformations are often based on the search for the 
moment where country A replaces country B. As Kupchan (2012, 182) reminds 
us, these “ordering moments” have typically historically been brought about 
through “postwar settlements”. Though there was no formal treaty to mark it, 
the end of bipolarity was also a post-war ordering moment of sorts.  
 
Despite the various sources of a decline in support for US positions and 
preferences noted above, we are still missing a clear single ordering moment 
that marks the end of the old unipolar system and the creation of a new one.  
Moreover, the nature of the ongoing power transition means that we are unlikely 
                                                 
6 See, for example, Chan (2007). 
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to see a single ordering moment that is (hopefully at least) brought about by one 
side defeating the other; either militarily or in the way that the Cold War came to 
an end. There may indeed be some point in the future when China replaces the 
US as the global predominant power – perhaps even a unipolar one – and “rules 
the world” (Jacques 2009). But for the time being at least, the dominant concern 
is not so much what might happen in a new sinocentric order, but how the 
current order is incrementally being revised and reconfigured rather than 
replaced by something new. And rather than change in the global system being 
marked by a single overarching ordering moment, it might make more sense to 
look for a range of a different ordering moments in different issue areas.  
 
Furthermore, a weaker US is not the same thing as a weak US. Acharya 
persuasively (2014) argues that Washington is no longer able to freely impose its 
preferences on the world as it once did in the past. Nevertheless, if we think in 
terms of which country has “the largest single aggregation of power” (Haass 
2008, 45), it is still difficult to look too far beyond the US.7 Changing the world 
and establishing a new order as the globally predominant power is one thing; 
pushing for change and trying to exert leadership in some areas) from a 
subordinate position is something else altogether.  
 
2.3 Bipolarity 2.0? 
One alternative to a unipolar order is the return to some form of bipolarity. And 
the idea that the US and China share some sort of special co-responsibility for 
                                                 
7 And Nye (2010) is right to argue that the popular response to the global financial crisis might have 
exaggerated the extent and speed of the demise of US global power (and its replacement with Chinese 
power). 
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providing global public goods - or perhaps more correctly – should develop some 
form of co-leadership - does have some adherents (White 2012). While the 
original conception of an emerging G2 was largely rejected in China, 
subsequently the idea of a bipolar relationship of sorts was discussed as Chinese 
analysts considered what Xi Jinping’s concept of a “new type of great power 
relations” might look like in practice. But even when the term bipolarity is 
explicitly used to refer to some form of new relationship and new world order,8 
it does not sound like the previous bipolarity of the Cold War era; one where 
groups form as camps and blocs in fixed relationships in common opposition to 
the alternative pole.  
 
This is partly because the existential threat that created the “Us” and “Them” of 
the Cold War is no longer the major driver of international alliances that it once 
was. To be sure, the threat of interstate (nuclear) war does establish the 
overarching framework that largely conditions relations in other issue areas in 
some parts of the world; in South Asia for example. But in general, there is no 
overwhelming geostrategic security consideration that forces countries to 
choose between supporting one of two alternatives, and rejecting and opposing 
the alternative on all other issue areas.  
 
Indeed, in many respects (and in some issue areas), there simply are not two 
polar opposites to choose from. China’s embrace of the capitalist global economy 
might not have entailed the wholesale adoption of western neoliberalism. But it 
clearly hasn't create a diametrically different polar opposite form of Chinese 
                                                 
8 For details of when it is, see Zeng and Breslin (2016). 
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economic activity from the type that dominates in other countries. And crucially, 
dealing with China does not create an exclusive relationship; there is certainly 
nothing about having economic relations with China that precludes also having 
economic relations with the US or anywhere else. Nor does building a security 
alliance with the US preclude having strong economic relationships with China, 
as is the case with a number of Southeast Asian nations. Whereas the nature of 
the Cold War resulted in exclusive relationships, the nature of the contemporary 
global capitalism encourages promiscuity.  
 
3 Multipolarity or multiple sites of authority? 
While the focus on China as the most likely challenger to (or co-leader with) the 
US is entirely understandable, the distribution of power is more fragmented and 
uneven than a conception of a single power shift between two powers suggests. 
And while the rising powers share some traits and objectives, and five of them 
share an acronym and an institutionalised relationship, they do not constitute a 
single group or bloc. The paths to prominence of the rising powers are fundamentally 
different, they occupy different power positions, and draw on different combinations 
of sources of power (Kingah and Quiliconi 2016). Even those who share Chinese 
dissatisfaction with the existing order do so with different degrees of enthusiasm 
(Liu 2016), resulting in “intellectual disarray” (Kupchan 2012, 183) and the 
promotion of a variety of different governance preferences by different actors 
(Acharya 2014). The result is a rather complicated and competitive environment 
– perhaps even a messy one – where different preferences are articulated and 
promoted in different issue areas by an increasing number of actors.  
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So if unipolarity is coming to an end – or has already ended – and bipolarity 
seems overly simplistic, what of the idea of a turn towards multipolarity? If we 
think back to Mitrany’s understanding of the best way of constructing 
international order, add to this a conception of the changing nature of the 
current global order, bring in the importance of legitimacy and followership, and 
a slightly different picture of changing configurations of power and influence in a 
post unipolar global order begins to emerge. This understanding moves away 
from the connotation of fixed alliances that is – or at least was in the past – 
associated with polarity and instead points Mitrany’s (1966) argument that 
different actors can have legitimacy and take leadership in different issue areas, 
rather than one actor emerging as an accepted, legitimate and effective leader 
across all issue areas.  
 
So rather than power transferring from an old hegemon to a new one, or even to 
a group of different new poles in the global order, different sets of actors appear 
to have different levels of authority, and different abilities to attract supporters 
and allies, depending on the specific issue at hand. Rather than talk of 
multipolarity, it is more useful to think of multiple sites of authority where there 
are different nodes of power (Womack 2016), with different putative leaders 
competing for followership in the global order (Acharya 2014). 
 
3.1 Power beyond the state 
A further reason for challenging (simplistic) assumptions about multipolarity is 
that it places too much emphasis on states – or states alone – as the potential 
sites of power (and thus polarity). And while states are clearly still central to the 
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study of global power, they are not the only actors. For example, you don’t have 
to think that the era of the nation state is dead as Ohmae did (1995) to 
nevertheless accept that non state actors and “private authority” (Hall and 
Biersteker 2002) are important components of global power structures.  
 
The most obvious example is the power of major corporations. If we return to 
China for an example, then it is clear that the way in which China’s state elites 
chose to re-engage the global economy from the 1980s had a significant impact 
on global trade and investment flows. It was also used as evidence that “China is 
becoming a fourth pole in the international system” as way back as the early 
1990s (Kristoff 1993, 62). But if this was an example of China’s emerging power 
to change the world, it was a power that China could not simply wield on its own. 
It was also built on the investment and production decisions of major global 
companies, many of them headquartered in the US and Europe, and we might 
even argue was predicated in some ways on the purchasing habits and 
preferences of consumers in the west. If this is power, then the ability to change 
how, where, and at what cost global production occurs is at the very least shared 
between the (Chinese) state and major global companies. And of course, non-
state economic actors like major hedge funds and major banks, have the ability 
to move money in and out of economies at the touch of a button in ways that 
have resulted in more than one major economic crisis (Korinek 2011). 
 
Not only do major companies have considerable power to decide what type of 
economic activity takes place where, private actors are also key actors in the 
evolution of governance forms in some areas. For example, private credit rating 
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agencies have played a key role in economic governance for many years through 
their evaluation of the creditworthiness of national economies that can have 
huge implications for the nature of global financial flows.  These evaluations can 
also “discipline” political elites intro following the sort of economic policies that 
will result in a good rating (Sinclair 2008). In Southeast Asia, private actors have 
been engaged by individual countries and by ASEAN as an organisation as 
partners in the search for effective forms of governance over policy arenas like 
air-borne pollution and haze, and the regional palm oil industry. This can include 
private actors actively lobbying for new forms of governance that serves their 
interests, rather than just being coopted by national or regional policy makers 
(Breslin and Nesadurai 2018). 
 
Moreover, there is more to the non-state sector than just companies and 
corporations. For example, thinking back to Mitrany’s emphasis on the 
importance of technical specialist, students of governance and policy transfer 
have long emphasised the importance of transnational epistemic communities of  
professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular 
domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within 
that domain or issue area (Haas 1992, 3) 
When it comes to thinking about global leadership, this suggests the importance 
of focussing on those “policy entrepreneurs” that play a key role in advocating 
and spreading ideas and norms relating to global regulation through these 
networks (Seabrooke and Wigan 2013). While this can take the form of the 
network representing the interests of one state or another – a means of 
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transnationalising state power – it can also in some cases lead to the network 
establishing some form of identity and influence in its own right (Zeitlin 2015). 
 
Engaging with policy networks inside and outside Europe has become an 
important way in which the European Union EU) seeks to spread its governance 
norms and preferences. In some areas, this has created a leadership role of sorts 
for these European networks. For example, despite the fact that there is some 
suspicion in places that Europe tries to occupy a “moral high ground” when it 
comes to environmental issues, there is a wide acknowledgement that Europe 
has considerable capacity on environmentally related scientific issues. So here, 
any leadership (and legitimacy as a leader) that Europe has in the environmental 
realm is partly a result of the deliberate promotion of environmental strategies 
by the EU, but also partly a result of the expertise of European networks of 
scientific communities.9 This knowledge base – as articulated through the 
relationship between scientific and policy communities – might give the EU 
normative power and a leadership role on the environment, but it is power and 
leadership that derives in large part from the expertise and perceived legitimacy 
of non-state actors. 
 
3.2 Regions as Actors 
The above example of the EU and transnational networks highlight the role that 
regions can play as the originators and deliverers of preferred values and 
policies that have significance and influence beyond the regional sphere itself . 
Here, it is important to distinguish between regions as actors, and regions as a 
                                                 
9 On European environmental leadership, see Godzimirski (2015).  
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means through which states exercise power and promote their interests. Put 
another way, does a region have an interest and/or ability to act that is not 
simply a reflection of the interest of the dominant regional power?  
 
To be sure, the “actorness” of different regions varies considerably, and not all 
have the ability or desire to be global actors, let alone leaders. Despite it’s 
various ongoing problems, the EU remains the most obvious example of a region 
that has not only developed an identity as an independent global actor (van 
Langenhove 2012) but has also deliberately tried to externalise its governance 
preferences, though with different levels of success in different policy areas 
(Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009). In some areas (like the environment), it 
has been identified as exercising global leadership (Zito 2005). But the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) too has been identified as 
playing an independent leadership role beyond its borders (Kim 2012), albeit in 
in the broader Asian region rather than globally. Other regional bodies have also 
in some ways been forced to become global actors through the way in which the 
EU has established interregional relations with them to discuss (and spread) 
European ideas over how best to provide transnational governance and global 
public goods (Soderbaum and van Langenhove 2006; Mattheis and Wunderlich 
2017).  
 
Even when regional organizations do not possess much actorness (let alone 
provide leadership) beyond their borders, they importantly remind us that 
power and leadership can be exercised at different levels or places. At times, and 
on some issues, the region might be perceived as a more effective or more 
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legitimate (or both) site of governance than the global level. This is particularly 
so where the global level is seen as representing the interests and goals of “some” 
(which often simply means the West) rather than all. The decision to create the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank might be a case in point here.  
 
Referring back to Mitrany, a conceptual problem emerges around the very basic 
question of identifying exactly what the region is in which a leader does or 
should operate. Even within the same geographic space, there can be a number 
of different regional sites of governance, and therefore regional leadership. Using 
China as an example again, we can identify China’s participation in (and in some 
cases leadership of) a wide range of different governance projects that have been 
described as being “regional”. These include sub-regional projects in East and 
Southeast Asia (ASEAN-China Framework Agreement on Cooperation; Greater 
Mekong Subregion); still emerging financial trilateral cooperation between 
China, South Korea and Japan; collaboration alongside Korea and Japan with 
ASEAN (ASEAN Plus Three, the Chiang Mai Initiative); a separate exclusive 
bilateral relationship with ASEAN (The China-ASEAN Free Trade Area); a 
proposal for a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership that would 
expand the ASEAN plus three definition of region to include New Zealand, 
Australia and India; an even wider concept of region as Asia Pacific rather than 
just East Asia (APEC); an entirely different concept of region built on relations 
with former Soviet States to the north and (north)west (the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization)’ and a still evolving and unclear conception of 
territory and space built around the AIIB and/or the one belt one road initiatives. 
We could also further complicate matters by adding in China’s participation in a 
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non-geographic based organization in the shape of the BRICS (Brazil Russia India 
China South Africa).  
 
What does all this mean for understandings of governance and leadership in a 
post unipolar world? One very simple conclusion is the importance of reiterating 
the significance of multi-level governance perspectives on authority, 
organization and leadership. And perhaps more important, noting that it is often 
not a case of identifying if governance is provided at the global or regional level 
(or somewhere else), but that forms of governance can and do exist at different 
levels at the same time; sometimes in potentially conflicting ways but also often 
in ways that complement and support each other. The promotion of regional 
environmental solutions by the UN might be one example of such 
complementarity (Elliott and Breslin 2015), and the role of the African Union in 
providing peacekeeping functions on the African continent might be another 
(Badmus 2015). So the region can be thought of as both a check on the creation 
of truly global forms of governance on some issues, and at the same time a 
building block towards it on other issues. Moreover, this understanding of 
different sites of governance means that different countries and actors can 
pursue and provide leadership on the same issue at different levels at the same 
time.  
 
Another related conclusion is the need to identify leadership (or potential 
leadership) across a range of regions within any given geographic area rather 
than just focussing on one manifestation of region. Or put another way, a country 
that might be a regional leader on one issue might not even be conceived of as 
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being part of the region at all when that region is defined by another set of issues 
and concerns.  
 
And finally, defining what the region is – or perhaps more importantly, could or 
should be – can be a significant source of power and leadership itself. If we 
return to the above example of China’s different regional identities and 
interactions, then Chinese preferences for an East Asia region (defined as ASEAN 
plus Three) might in part be because China can exert more influence in this 
region than in an Indo-Pacific region (that includes India and Australasia) 
favored by others (Breslin 2007). Or to put it another way, the ability to lead or 
not is often shaped or constrained by who or what you are trying to lead.  
 
3.3 Followership in a non-polar world 
The third and final challenge to the understanding of polarity brings us back to 
assumptions about divergence in power capabilities and political alliances based 
on different issue/policy areas. The core argument at the heart of this paper is 
that bloc-type polar alliances across issue areas are unlikely to be the dominating 
characteristic of global order in the foreseeable future. Of course some alliances 
may be more sustainable and across the board in nature than others. Japan’s 
refusal to join the AIIB, for example, might be taken as a signal of a rather 
comprehensive and enduring Japan-US relationship across issue areas. But at the 
same time, the fact that the UK led a move by other traditional US allies to join 
the AIIB might tell another story about the weakening of previously more 
comprehensive sets of relationships. And the fact that those same western liberal 
actors have been much less keen to follow attempts to establish China’s basic 
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position and understanding as the basis for discussions on cybersecurity, for 
example (Sceats 2015), suggests that it is not a case of a new holistic bloc-type 
relationship replacing an old one.  
 
If this understanding is correct, then clearly we need to try to identify the 
different positions that might provide the basis for leadership on any given issue 
area. The next step is to consider the extent to which they might be transferred 
from preferences to real leadership; to concrete proposals and initiatives 
(and/or organisations) that others are prepared to join. Here, it is useful to think 
of a tripartite distinction between willingness, capacity and acceptance – 
particularly, but not only, of those emerging powers that are widely thought to 
be challenging the nature of the existing global order (Kingah and Quiliconi 
2016).  
 
That powers (either rising or established) actually want to lead should not 
simply be assumed. For example, the US was reluctant to assume full global 
leadership in and after WWI, and at least part of the appeal of the Trump 
presidential message was the promise to reduce international contributions and 
place “America First”. There also remains some doubt the extent to which China 
is prepared to take on all of the burdens and responsibilities that go with 
leadership (Shambaugh 2013). Despite a more active role in recent years, the 
promotion of “a new type of great power relations” by the Chinese leadership has 
at least something to do with establishing the limits to what China should be 
expected to do as a great power that is still also a developing country with many 
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domestic problems still left to be resolved; problems that must take primacy 
over the provision of global public goods for others (Zeng and Breslin 2016).  
 
Capability is important too. Other countries might have wanted to do something 
about the development finance gaps in Asia, but did not have had the resources 
that China had available to start up the AIIB. However, there is more to capability 
than just material resources. If we think in terms of ideational and normative 
capacities, we can ask if a country or any other actor has not just a set of new 
ideas, but also the means to articulate and disseminate them to others? And here 
in some ways capacity and acceptance should be seen as two sides of the same 
coin; unless a putative leader is prepared to force and bully its leadership on 
others, its capacity to lead is in large part dependent on others’ desire to let it, 
and their willingness to align themselves to a leader.  
 
As noted a number of years ago before the rise of China and the other BRICS 
were being seriously studied: 
a leader-centered approach seriously distorts how we understand the 
nature of leadership in international politics. Focusing on the traits, 
interests, and capabilities of leaders and would-be challengers may tell us 
a great deal about which states are bound to be the most powerful in the 
international system at a particular historical conjuncture. But that 
approach tells us little about leadership, because it tells us little about the 
dynamics of followership - in other words, what drives followers to follow 
(Cooper, Higgott and Nossal 1991, 395). 
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Evidence suggests that the inclination to follow often appears to be dependent 
on whether the leading power incorporates elements of the putative follower’s 
interests and positions into its own agenda (Schirm 2010). So if effective 
leadership (other than through coercion and force) is dependent on followership, 
this perhaps suggests the need for a stronger focus in the future on the followers 
than much of the recent scholarhship on the role and goals of rising powers has 
found space to encompass. 
 
4 Conclusion 
With the benefit of hindsight, the current apparent turn to a fragmented non-
polar world might only be a temporary phenomenon. After all, what appeared to 
be an inevitable Japanese rise to some form of global economic leadership in the 
mid to late 1980s did not turn to be inevitable at all, and all of the current crop of 
rising powers have domestic governance challenges to deal with that could 
result in a reduction in their willingness and capability to provide forms of 
leadership in the future. Or they might do things as they continue to rise that 
reduce their legitimacy as a leader in the eyes of putative followers. Or 
alternatively, we might simply be in an interregnum before the creation of a new 
polar world order (of whatever type) under new leadership.  
 
For the time being, though, the argument here is that we will continue to live in 
an era characterized by ongoing and complex negotiations leading to the 
reformulation of alliances and relationships in a global order where an 
increasingly weak and potentially less globally inclined US nevertheless remains 
the predominant global power. And while Mitrany’s preferences for a functional 
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world do not provide us with a simple and clear roadmap of how to construct 
such a functional world, or what the subsequent global order might look at, his 
emphasis on functionalism does provide us with a useful way of thinking about 
alternative non-polar forms of global organization; including forms that are not 
uniquely the preserve of states and state actors as participants and potential 
leaders (in some, if not all, issue areas).  
 
A functionally inclined world with issue based alliances rather than blocs and 
camps provides an opportunity for a variety of actors to promote themselves as 
leaders; not necessarily global leaders per se, but leaders on a specific issue area. 
It also allows for them to gain followership on some domains from those who 
might find themselves in diametrically opposite alliances on other issue areas. 
When combined with an understanding of governance beyond – or is that 
beneath – the global level, then the consequence is a messy and fragmented set 
of different (sometimes, but not always) overlapping governance and leadership 
forms and agendas. And it is a world that arguably places more of an emphasis 
on the preferences of putative followers than the dominant focus on the 
preference of potential challengers and leaders often allows for.  
 
Despite the emphasis here on discrete and separate policy areas, it is important 
to accept that each policy domain is not hermetically sealed from what happens 
in others. In particular, the acceptance by others of a leader in one area can be 
heavily influenced by perceptions of how that putative leader has acted in other 
functional areas (either as a leader or not); particularly if the rising challenger 
power emerges from outside the heartlands of the liberal Western world. In 
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terms of the way in which some governance initiatives are perceived at least 
(and ultimately not surprisingly), the political and ideological differences that 
Mitrany thought should not be a consideration when developing effective forms 
of governance really do still have a key role to play today. This makes the task of 
building even selective leadership in some policy areas more difficult than is the 
case for established (liberal) powers whose fundamental commitment to existing 
order is less likely to be undermined by something that they do (or don't do) in 
one policy arena.  
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